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# Cable Damage Detection Using Time Domain Reflectometry and Model-Based Algorithms

G. A. Clark

March 27, 2008

Sixth Annual Sensors Workshop 2008  
Livermore, CA, United States  
April 1, 2008 through April 2, 2008

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# Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Sixth Annual Sensors Workshop 2008, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, April 1-2, 2008

## Cable Damage Detection Using Time Domain Reflectometry and Model-Based Algorithms

April 1-2, 2008



**Grace A. Clark**

**Eng/NSED/Systems and Decision Sciences Section**

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UCRL-CONF-XXXXXX

# Auspices and Disclaimer

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# We Have an Interdisciplinary Team

- **Graham Thomas - ENG/MMED**
  - Project Management
  - NDE, materials characterization
- **Chris Robbins - ENG/NSED**
  - Program Management
  - Data acquisition, hardware, signal processing software, NDE
- **Grace Clark - ENG/NSED**
  - Image/signal processing, target/pattern recognition, sensor data fusion, NDE
- **Katherine Wade - ENG/NSED**
  - Signal processing software and testing




# Agenda

- Introduction
  - The Cable Damage Detection Problem
  - This is work in progress
- Technical Approach - *Model-Based Damage Detection*
- Damage Detection Processing Results
  - Real Measurements, Artificial Damage - *Reported Earlier*
  - Real measurements, real damage
  - Performance Measurements
    - *ROC Curves, Confidence Intervals*
- Discussion and Plans




# We Are Testing Two-Conductor Flat Cables With Kapton Insulation - For Dielectric Anomalies


*Two-Conductor Flat Cable With Kapton Insulation*



*Foil Simulating a Capacitive Discontinuity (Damage)*



**Red TDR Signal => Good Cable**  
**Black TDR Signal => Damaged Cable**



## *Expected Damage Types:*

- **Compressions**
- **Punctures**
- **Short Circuits**
- **Open Circuits**




# The Technical Challenges/Issues are Difficult, But We Do Not Know Yet *Exactly* *How Difficult*

- We have access to only one end of the cable
- We cannot “Hi-Pot” the cables in place
- We have no exemplars of “real” damaged cables
  - We must “insult” them artificially
- We have no archive signals from the cables “As-Built”
  - Only a “typical” signal for an undamaged cable
- Small sample size
  - Small number of available cables for “insulting” (~ 60)
  - Obviates using supervised learning pattern recognition algorithms
  - Makes it difficult to create ensembles for building ROC curves
- Repeatability of Measurements (**A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE**)
  - Single cable - Test to test [*Apparently solved to first order*]
  - Cable to cable [*Under current investigation - OK to first order*]
- The signal shape changes significantly with the cable environment
  - We are building 2D and 3D “Mockups” for later use



# The Key Hardware Component is the *Pulse Insertion Unit (PIU)*

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# Our Focus is on *a Binary Detection Decision (Yes/No)*, NOT Failure Mode Classification or “Reliability”

## *Three Possible Hierarchical Decision Levels:*

### **1. Detection:**

- *Decide whether or not an abnormality in the cable TDR response exists (yes or no)*
- *Assume that an abnormal TDR response implies a flaw in the cable*

### **2. Flaw or Failure Mode Classification:**

- *Classify the type of failure mode or flaw detected, from among a fixed set of possible modes*

### **3. Final Decision:**

- *Using all of the information from the measurements and the previous two steps (fusion), decide whether the cable is “reliable or not reliable”*



# The Model-Based Damage Detection Approach:


## *Detect a Model Mismatch if Damage is Present*

- Exploit the fact that the TDR measurements are reasonably repeatable.
- Build a forward model of the dynamic system (cable) for the case in which *NO DAMAGE* exists
- Whiteness Testing on the *Innovations (Errors)*:  
Estimate the output of the actual system using measurements from a dynamic test.
  - If *no damage* exists, the model will match the measurements, so the “innovations” (errors) will be *statistically white*.
  - If a *damage* exists, the model will not match the measurements, so the “innovations” (errors) will *not be statistically white*.
- Weighted Sum Square Residuals (WSSR) Test:  
The WSSR provides a single metric for the model mismatch



# Step #1: System Identification to Estimate the Dynamic Model of the *Undamaged Cable*

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Option:UCRL-CONF-XXXXXX


Grace A. Clark, Ph.D.




**Step1 (System ID) is Done “Offline”**

**Step2 (Damage Testing) is Done “Online”**

**Step1 (System ID)**




**Step2 (Damage Testing)**



## Scalar WSSR is Calculated Using a Sliding Window Over the Innovations Sequence $e(n)$

**WSSR = “Weighted Sum Squared Residuals”**



$$\gamma(n) = \sum_{j=n-W+1}^n \frac{e^2(j)}{V(j)}, \quad \text{for } n \geq W$$

*WSSR is a useful test statistic for detecting an abrupt change, or “jump” in the innovations*

# The Scalar WSSR Confidence Interval Threshold is Parameterized by *the Window Length W*

**Summary of the WSSR Test for Significance**  $\alpha = .05$ :

$$\gamma(n) = \sum_{j=n-W+1}^n \frac{e^2(j)}{V(j)}, \quad \text{for } n \geq W$$

$$V(n) = \frac{1}{W} \sum_{j=n-W+1}^n [e^2(j) - \bar{e}(j)]^2, \quad \text{for } n \geq W$$

$$\bar{e}(n) = \frac{1}{W} \sum_{j=n-W+1}^n e(j), \quad \text{for } n \geq W$$

$$\tau = W + 1.96\sqrt{2W}$$

$$\text{If } \gamma(n) \begin{matrix} \geq H_1 \\ < H_0 \end{matrix} \tau, \quad (\tau = \text{Decision Threshold})$$

*In practice, we implement the WSSR test as follows:*

- Let  $F_E$  = Fraction of samples of  $\gamma(n)$  that exceed the threshold
- If  $F_E \leq \alpha$ , Declare  $H_0$  is true (innovations are white, no jump)
- If  $F_E > \alpha$ , Declare  $H_1$  is true (innovations are not white, jump)



# We Acquired an Ensemble of Real Signals for Processing


The PIU was never disconnected between acquisitions

Experiment E1: Data from 2\_13\_07

## UNDAMAGED

Reference Signals (*Undamaged*):


refa, refb, refc



## MINOR DAMAGE


Minor Damage (*pin hole, knife present, no short*):

minor1a, minor1b, minor1c




Minor Damage (*pin hole, knife removed, no short*):

minor2a, minor2b, minor2c



Minor Damage (*pin hole, knife removed, cable rubbed to remove short*):


minor3a, minor3b, minor3c



## MAJOR DAMAGE

Major Damage (*pin hole, knife removed, conductors shorted*):

major1a, major1b, major1c




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# Experiment 1: System Identification Results




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# System Identification: Preprocessed Signals




**Example:  
Major  
Damage**


## System Identification: *The Model Fit is Good*




## System Identification: *Correlation Tests are Satisfactory*



## System Identification Whiteness Test Result = *White*



## System Identification WSSR Test Result = *No Model Mismatch!*



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
# Experiment 1: *“Minor3” Damage*




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E1\_xd\_m3a\_xuC.pdf


**“Minor3 Damage”:** *Damage Is Difficult to Distinguish Visually*



## Minor3 Damage: *The Innovations are Small, But Correlated*




## “Minor3 Damage” WSSR Result = *Model Mismatch!*



## Minor3a,b,c Damage

### Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve = **Perfect**

$W$	$P_{FA}$	$P_D$
24	1	1
36	0.66667	1
48	0.66667	1
49	0.66667	1
50	0.66667	1
51	0.66667	1
52	0.66667	1
53	0.66667	1
54	0.66667	1
55	0.66667	1
56	0.33333	1
57	0.33333	1
58	0.33333	1
59	0.33333	1
60	0	1
61	0	1
62	0	0.66667
70	0	0
80	0	0



# Conclusions & Future Work

- **The damage effects are somewhat distributed about the signal**
  - They are not necessarily localized in time/space
  - This gives *added value* to the model-based approach because it does not rely on localized damage effects
- **Tests with real data validate the algorithms**
  - **“Minor3” and “Major” Damage** give perfect ROC curves
  - **“Minor1” and “Minor2” Damage** give suboptimal ROC Curves

## Future Work:

- **Performance Tests using our *new Pulse Insertion Unit (PIU)***
- **More repeatability studies:**
  - Measurement-to-measurement for one cable
  - Cable-to-cable
- **Cable “Insult Studies” with various types of damage**
- **Experiments in realistic cable environments - *2D Mockup, 3D Mockup***
- **Build and test GUI’s**
- **Use algorithms with other applications**



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
# Contingency VG's



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
# Step #2: Compare the Responses of the Undamaged and Damaged Cables ==> *Damage Detection*

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


# E1: “Undamaged” Signals Were Cut for

## Step1: System Identification



# The “Damage Signals” Were Cut for *Step1: Damage Testing*



*Processing Details for the Signals in Red  
are shown in this presentation*




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# Experiment 1: *Major Damage*




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
## **“Major Damage” Signal Shows Obvious Damage**



## “Major Damage” Innovations *Are Large and Correlated*




## “Major Damage” WSSR Test Result = Model Mismatch



## Major Damage:

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve = **Perfect**

<i>W</i>	<i>P<sub>FA</sub></i>	<i>P<sub>D</sub></i>
24	1	1
36	0.66667	1
48	0.66667	1
49	0.66667	1
50	0.66667	1
51	0.66667	1
52	0.66667	1
53	0.66667	1
54	0.66667	1
55	0.66667	1
56	0.33333	1
57	0.33333	1
58	0.33333	1
59	0.33333	1
60	0	1
61	0	1
62	0	1
70	0	1
80	0	1



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**Experiment 1:**  
***ROC Curves for Minor1, Minor2,  
and All 12 Damage Signals***




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## Minor1a,b,c Damage

### Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve


$W$	$P_{FA}$	$P_D$
24	1	1
36	1	0.66667
48	1	0.66667
49	1	0.66667
50	1	0.66667
55	1	0.66667
56	1	0.33333
57	1	0.33333
58	0	0.33333
59	0	0.33333
60	0	0
61	0	0
62	0	0
63	0	0
64	0	0
65	0	0
70	0	0
80	0	0

Probability of Detection vs. Probability of False Alarm



# Minor2a,b,c Damage

## Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve



# All 12 Signals: Minor1a,b,c, Minor2a,b,c, Minor3a,b,c, Majora,b,c

## Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve

$W$	$P_{FA}$	$P_D$
24	1	1
36	1	0.66667
48	1	0.66667
49	1	0.66667
50	1	0.66667
55	1	0.66667
56	1	0.33333
57	1	0.33333
58	0.66667	0.33333
59	0.58333	0.33333
60	0.58333	0
61	0.5	0
62	0.41667	0
63	0.25	0
64	0.25	0
65	0.25	0
70	0.25	0
80	0.25	0

Probability of Detection vs. Probability of False Alarm

